Co-Leaders: Paul Rabinow and Ken Oye

The defining goal of SynBERC is to make biology into an engineering discipline. To this end, Thrusts 1 through 3 link evolved systems and designed systems, with emphasis on organizing and refining elements of biology through design rules that enable the engineering of complex integrated biological systems. Thrust 4 examines synthetic biology within a frame of human practices, with reciprocal emphasis on ways that economic, political, and cultural forces may condition the development of synthetic biology and on ways that synthetic biology may significantly inform human security, health, and welfare through the new objects that it brings into the world. It includes both research and design modules (r&d) under the leadership of Paul Rabinow of the University of California at Berkeley and assessment and policy modules (a&p) under the leadership of Kenneth Oye of MIT. These modules are designed to be complementary and synergistic.

R&D Modules: Ethics, Organizational Form, and Innovation

• Research on evolving ethical practices in synthetic biology and related emergent fields (e.g. nanotechnology in NSF funded centers)
• Design of relationship of ethics and science in view of the innovative and experimental organization of objectives, practices, and venues in synthetic biology;
• Research on new institutional arrangements and interventions appropriate to the design and production approaches in synthetic biology
• Design of interfaces and pathways connecting engineering practices, scientific goals, and human practices
• Research and design collaborative approaches between and among relevant biological and human sciences.

A&P Modules: Intellectual Property and Risk Assessment

• Assessment of approaches to sharing and/or guarding the parts, devices, chassis, systems, protocols, standards and design rules that constitute synthetic biology;
• Policy implications for property rights and sharing regimes for investment, advancement of knowledge and diffusion of benefits of innovation; practicums in Registry of Biological Parts; Office of Biological Disenchantment; copyright and public licensing of protocols and standards
• Assessment of security risks and methods for engaging with uncertainty over effects;
• Policy practicums for governmental and nongovernmental organizations;
• Assessment and policy development of educational materials on synthetic biology for the policy community; working with synthetic biologists on ways to limit risks through self governance.

Joint Human Practices Testbed: Bio-Preparedness, Bio-Security, Bio-Safety

• Policy assessment of safety and security risks associated with technical development;
• Coordination of existing technical expertise in bio-security;
• Analysis of overall security platforms and their relation to synthetic biology;
• Development of distinctive security and preparedness platforms.